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According to the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Modigliani-Miller theorem, corporate risk management 
is irrelevant to the value of the firm. However, it is apparent that managers are constantly engaged in hedging 
activities that are directed at the reduction of corporate risks. As an explanation for this clash between theory 
and practice, imperfections in the capital market are used to argue for the relevance of corporate risk 
management function. This paper analyses corporate risk management practices and decision to hedge in large 
Croatian non-financial companies. It explores if decision to hedge corporate risks in the analysed companies is 
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1.  Introduction 
 
For a long time it was believed that corporate risk management
1 is irrelevant to the value of the firm and 
the arguments in favour of the irrelevance were based on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964; 
Lintner, 1965; Mossin, 1966) and the Modigliani-Miller theorem (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). One of the 
most important implications of CAPM is that diversified shareholders should care only about the 
systematic component of total risk. This implies that managers of firms who are acting in the best interests 
of shareholders should be indifferent about hedging of risks that are unsystematic. Miller and Modigliani's 
proposition supports CAPM findings. The conditions underlying MM propositions also imply that decisions to 
hedge corporate exposures to interest rates, exchange rates and commodity prices are completely irrelevant 
because stockholders already protect themselves against such risks by holding well-diversified portfolios.  
Despite the fact that, in the basic MM world, hedging does not alter firm value, markets where 
derivatives are traded are dominated by corporations and institutions, not by individuals trading for their 
personal accounts. In the real world, financial managers and treasurers give a great deal of thought to 
matters of capital structure and securities design. Additionally, the corporate use of derivatives in hedging 
different kinds of corporate risks (e.g. interest rate, currency or commodity price risks) is widespread and 
growing. As an explanation for this clash between theory and practice, imperfections in the capital market are 
used to argue for the relevance of corporate risk management function. Research in the 1980s and 1990s has 
extended the knowledge on risk management by examining the unique characteristics of large, widely held 
corporations. Based on work by Mayers and Smith (1982) in the area of the corporate demand for 
insurance, scholars such as Stulz (1984), Smith and Stulz (1985) and Shapiro and Titman (1998) have 
examined why large, well-diversified firms actively engage in hedging activities. The authors demonstrated 
several theories of hedging which overcome the irrelevancy arguments of modern portfolio and corporate 
finance theory. Most of these theories rely on the introduction of frictions into the MM model, and argue 
that market imperfections enable firms to add value through hedges that can not be exactly duplicated by 
individual investors.  
 
 
2.  Literature review  
 
Scholars have constructed two classes of explanations or determinants for management concern with 
hedging of non-systematic risk, which overcome the irrelevancy arguments of modern portfolio and 
corporate finance theory. The first class of explanations focuses on risk management as a mean to 
maximise shareholder value, and the second focuses on risk management as a mean to maximise managers’ 
private utility.  
Positive theories of risk management, as a lever for shareholder value creation, argue that firm value is 
a concave objective function because of capital market imperfections. The first theory suggests that, by 
reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease costs of financial distress (Mayers and Smith, 
1982; Myers, 1984; Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Shapiro and Titman, 1998). In the MM world, 
financial distress is assumed to be costless. Hence, altering the probability of financial distress does not 
affect firm value. If financial distress is costly, firms have incentives to reduce its probability, and hedging 
is one method by which a firm can reduce the volatility of its earnings. By reducing the variance of a firm’s 
cash flows or accounting profits, hedging decreases the probability, and thus the expected costs, of financial 
distress. Additionally, Smith and Stulz (1985) have argued that, while the reduction of financial distress 
costs increases firm value, it augments shareholder value even further by simultaneously raising the firm’s 
potential to carry debt. Corporate risk management lowers the cost of financial distress, which leads to a 
higher optimal debt ratio and the tax shields of the additional debt capital further increases the value of the 
firm. This theory has been empirically proven by, among others, Campbell and Kracaw, 1987; 
Bessembinder 1991; Dolde, 1995; Mian, 1996 and Haushalter 2000.  
The second hedging rationale suggests that, by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease 
agency costs (see: Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to Dobson and Soenen (1993) there are three 
sound reasons based on agency costs why management should hedge corporate risk. First, hedging reduces 
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uncertainty by smoothing the cash flow stream thereby lowering the firm's cost of debt. Since the agency 
cost is borne by management, assuming informational asymmetry between management and bondholders, 
hedging will increase the value of the firm. Therefore, management will rationally choose to hedge. 
Second, given the existence of debt financing, cash flow smoothing through exchange risk hedging will 
tend to reduce the risk-shifting as well as the underinvestment problems (see Jensen and Smith, 1985). 
Finally, hedging reduces the probability of financial distress and thereby increases duration of contractual 
relations between shareholders. By fostering corporate reputation acquisition, hedging contributes directly 
to the amelioration of the moral-hazard agency problem. Results of MacMinn (1987), MacMinn and Han 
(1990), Bessembinder (1991), Minton and Schrand (1999) and Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002) 
support this hedging rationale.  
Another theory that focuses on risk management as a mean to maximise shareholder value argue that, 
by reducing the volatility of cash flows, firms can decrease expected taxes. This rationale is put forward by 
Smith and Stulz (1985) who have argued that the structure of the tax code can make it beneficial for the 
firms to take positions in futures, forward, or option markets. If a firm faces a convex tax function, then the 
after-tax value of the firm is a concave function of its pre-tax value. If hedging reduces the variability of 
pre-tax firm values, then the expected tax liability is reduced and the expected post-tax value of the firm is 
increased, as long as the cost of the hedge is not too large. By reducing the effective long run average tax 
rate, activities which reduce the volatility in reported earnings will enhance shareholder value. More 
convex the effective tax schedule is, the greater is the reduction in expected taxes. This rationale has been 
supported by Zimmerman (1988), Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), 
Mian (1996) and Graham and Smith (1996).  
In addition, reducing cash flow volatility can improve the probability of having sufficient internal funds 
for planned investments eliminating the need either to cut profitable projects or bear the transaction costs of 
obtaining external funding. The main hypothesis is that, if access to external financing (debt and/or equity) 
is costly, firms with investment projects requiring funding will hedge their cash flows to avoid a shortfall in 
their funds, which could precipitate a costly visit to the capital markets. An interesting empirical insight 
based on this rationale is that firms which have substantial growth opportunities and face high costs when 
raising funds under financial distress will have an incentive to hedge more of their exposure than the 
average firm. This rationale has been explored by numerous scholars, among others by Smith and Stulz 
(1985), Stulz (1990), Lessard (1990), Shapiro and Titman (1998), Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991), 
Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Gay and Nam (1998), Graham and 
Rogers (1999), Minton and Schrand (1999), Haushalter (2000), Mello and Parsons (2000), Allayannis and 
Ofek (2001) and Haushalter, Randall and Lie (2002). 
Other line of reasoning that differs from the shareholders value maximisation hypothesis refers to the 
managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. It has been argued that firm managers have limited ability to 
diversify their own personal wealth position, associated with stock holdings and the capitalisation of their 
career earnings associated with their own employment position. Therefore, they will have an incentive to 
hedge their own wealth on the expense of the shareholders. Usually that kind of hedging is not conducted to 
improve value of company’s stockholders but to improve managers own wealth. To avoid this problem, 
managerial compensation contract must be designed so that when managers increase the value of the firm, 
they also increase their expected utility. This can usually be obtained by adding option-like provisions to 
managerial contracts. This rationale was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has been further explored by 
Smith and Stulz (1985). Results of some empirical studies have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g. see: 
Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998) while, in contrast, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter 
(2000) have not found evidence that corporate hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. 
A very different managerial theory of hedging, based on asymmetric information, has been presented 
by Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992), who have focused on managers’ 
reputations. In both of these models, it is argued that managers may prefer to engage in risk management 
activities in order to better communicate their skills to the labour market. Breeden and Viswanathan (1990) 
and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) have argued that younger executives and those with shorter tenures have 
less developed reputations than older as well as longer-tenure managers. Therefore, they are more willing 
to embrace new concepts like risk management with the intention to signal their management quality. 
Tufano (1996) has tested these assumptions and found that there is no meaningful relationship between 
CEO and CFO age and the extent of risk management activity. However, he has proven that firms whose FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-13 
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CFOs have fewer years in their current job are more likely to engage in greater risk management activities, 
confirming the hypothesis that newer executives are more willing to engage in risk management activities 
than are their counterparts with long-tenures. Thus, the results can be seen as consistent with Breeden and 
Viswanathan (1996) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1992) theory. 
Results of empirical studies have also proven that benefits of risk management program depend to the 
size of the company. Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Dolde (1995), Mian (1996), Getzy, Minton and 
Schrand (1997) and Hushalter (2000) have argued that larger firms are more likely to hedge. One of the key 
factors in the corporate risk management rationale pertains to the costs of engaging in risk-management 
activities. The cost of hedging includes the direct transaction costs as well as the agency costs of ensuring 
that managers transact appropriately. Transaction costs of hedging include the costs of trading, as well as 
the substantial costs of information systems needed to provide the data necessary to decide on the 
appropriate hedging positions to take. The agency costs that such activities bring include the costs of the 
internal control systems to run the hedging program. These costs are associated with the opportunities for 
speculation that participation in derivative markets allows. The assumption underlying this rationale is that 
there are substantial economies of scale or economically significant costs related to hedging. Indeed, for 
many firms (particularly smaller firms), the marginal benefits of a hedging program may be exceeded by 
the marginal costs. These facts suggest there may be sizable set-up costs related to operating a corporate 
risk-management program. Thus, numerous firms may not hedge at all, even though they are exposed to 
financial risks, simply because it is not an economically worthwhile activity. On the basis of the empirical 
results, it can be argued that only large firms with sufficiently large risk exposures are likely to benefit from 
a formal hedging program.  
 
 
3.  Corporate Risk Management in Croatian Companies 
 
3.1. Methodology and Data Collection 
 
Empirical research was conducted on the largest Croatian non-financial companies because these 
companies should have a developed risk management programme. Companies needed to meet two out of 
three conditions required by the Croatian Accounting Law
2 that relate to large companies to be selected in 
the sample - 1) a value of total assets higher than 108 million kuna, (2) income in the last 12 months higher 
than 216 million kuna, and/or (3) annual number of employees higher than 250. A list of the largest 400 
Croatian companies in the year 2005
3 has been used and 157 companies that have met the required criteria 
were selected in the sample. The primary advantage of this sample is that the evidence can be generalised 
to a broad class of firms in different industries. Financial firms were excluded from the sample because 
most of them are also market makers, hence their motivation in using risk management instruments (e.g. 
derivatives) may be different from the motivations of non-financial firms.  
The greatest challenge of this research was to find an appropriate data set, because the analysed 
companies have not been very public about their risk management activities. Data were collected from two 
sources: from annual reports and notes to the financial statements for the fiscal year 2005, and through the 
survey. We relied more on the survey data than on the annual reports due to the fact that not all of the 
analysed Croatian companies were obliged to report risk management activities in notes to the financial 
statements. This obligation refers only to those companies that are listed on the stock-exchange, while 
many companies in our sample are not public joint-stock companies.  
The questionnaire was mailed at the beginning of September 2006 to the firm’s chief financial officer 
or, if there was no such position, to the financial controller or the treasurer. The implicit assumption was 
that these are the persons most likely to have the relevant information. The questionnaires were addressed to 
a specific individual. It should be emphasised that the problem with a survey is that the person who fills in 
the questionnaire out does not necessarily have the relevant information or the motivation to provide 
careful and truthful answers. Moreover, questions are not always interpreted correctly. We tried to gauge 
accuracy in different ways. First, we wanted to make sure that the people who completed the questionnaire 
had the information we were interested in. This is why the questionnaire was sent to the chief financial 
                                                                          
2 In Croatian: Zakon o računovodstvu, Narodne novine 146/05. 
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officer or to the controller and the treasurer of the firm. Then we asked firms to tell us who actually filled 
out the questionnaire. In the vast majority of the cases (more than 90 per cent), the answering person was 
indeed, at least apparently, the CFO, the treasurer or the controller. Unless people who complete the 
questionnaire are dishonest or careless, we should therefore have received accurate information. 
In order to encourage willingness to participate, the respondents were promised a copy of the summarised 
results. Only 19 companies answered by the end of September, so a follow-up letter was sent to the non-
respondents. Sending a follow-up letter encouraged a response rate from 12 to 31 per cent. An adequate 
response rate is the problem that has been often raised in research based on a survey. We believe that the 
accomplished response rate is satisfactory for statistical generalisation (e.g. the response rate of the 1998 
Wharton survey of derivate usage, as reported in Bodnar, Hayt and Marston (1998) is 21 per cent). 
However, it is important to mention that the inability to compare the survey results to the data of non-
responding companies should be treated as a limitation of this research. 
Survey data were statistically analysed by using both univariate and multivariate analysis. We have 
used the independent sample t-test to calculate the differences between means for Croatian hedgers and 
nonhedgers. Independent sample t-test enables a calculation of statistically significant differences between 
small and mutually unrelated parametric samples (Bryman and Cramer, 1997). Croatian research sample 
was small, unrelated and parametric. In addition, research data were of a non-categorical nature 
(interval/ratio data), therefore t-test was found as the most suitable for univariate analysis. Additionally, 
correlation analysis was conducted by calculating Pearson’s correlation coefficient as it is the most 
common measure of linear correlation when variables are of interval/ratio nature. 
Regarding the multivariate analysis, binominal logistic regression was estimated to distinguish between 
the possible explanations for the decision to hedge corporate risks. Binomial (or binary) logistic regression 
has been selected because it is a form of regression that is used when the dependent variable is a dichotomy 
(limited, discrete and not continuous) and the independents are of any type
4 (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 1989; 
Rice, 1994; Allison, 1999; Menard, 2002). In our research the dependent variable was binary, while 
explanatory variables which were used to test research hypothesis were discrete as well as continuous, so 
the logistic regression model was a justified choice.  
 
 
3.2. Research Hypotheses 
 
Based on the arguments that arise from the presented literature survey, several hypotheses have been 
proposed in this paper. First we argue that hedging can increase the value of the firm by reducing the costs 
associated with financial distress, the agency costs of debt, expected taxes and capital market 
imperfections. These premises are known as the shareholder maximisation hypothesis and are tested in the 
following assumptions. The argument of reducing the costs of financial distress implies that the benefits of 
hedging should be greater the larger the fraction of fixed claims in the firm’s capital structure. The agency 
cost of debt argument implies that the benefits of hedging should be greater the higher the firm’s leverage 
and asymmetric information problem. The argument of costly external financing implies that the benefits of 
hedging should be greater the more growth options are in the firm’s investment opportunity set. The tax 
hypothesis suggests that the benefits of hedging should be greater the higher the probability that the firm’s 
pre-tax income is in the progressive region of the tax schedule, and the greater the value of the firm’s tax 
loss carry-forwards, investment tax credits and other provisions of the tax code. Additionally, the 
informational and transactional scale economies argument implies that larger firms will be more likely to 
hedge. Therefore, a positive relation between decision to hedge and a company’s size, leverage, asymmetric 
information problem, investment (growth) opportunities and expected taxes has been predicted.  
The next group of assumptions regards the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis. We argue that, 
due to the fact that a firm’s managers have limited ability to diversify their own personal wealth position 
associated with the stock holdings and the capitalisation of their career earnings, they have strong 
incentives to hedge. We test the hypothesis that managers with greater stock ownership would prefer more 
                                                                          
4 With a categorical dependent variable, discriminant function analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors are continuous 
and nicely distributed; logit analysis is usually employed if all of the predictors are categorical; and logistic regression is often 
chosen if the predictor variables are a mix of continuous and categorical variables and/or if they are not nicely distributed (logistic 
regression makes no assumptions about the distributions of the predictor variables).  FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-13 
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risk management, while those with greater option holdings would prefer less risk management. 
Additionally, firms with younger managers and those whose managers have shorter tenures on the job 
would be more inclined to manage risk. 
 
 
3.3. Research Variables  
 
A dependent variable has been created in the form of a binary (dichotomous) measure and was coded as 
“1” for those firms that hedge corporate risks and “0” for those firms that do not hedge corporate risks. In 
the group of companies named “hedgers” we included not only companies that use derivatives instruments 
as an instrument of corporate risk management, but also companies that use other types of hedging 
strategies like operational hedging, natural hedging, international diversification of business etc. The 
majority of the earlier empirical studies on risk management such as Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), 
Mian (1996), Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997), Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Cummins, Phillips 
and Smith (2001) have used a dichotomous variable that equalled one if a firm has used derivatives and 
zero if it has not. Because of the decision to include all corporate risk management activities, our 
dichotomous variable should not be subject to the inaccurate categorisation of functionally-equivalent 
financial position. This has allowed us to disentangle derivatives activity from risk management activity, 
which is a major advantage of our approach. 
To examine the hypothesis regarding the reduction of the financial distress cost and the informational 
and transactional scale economies argument, the size of the company and the firm’s leverage have been 
employed. The size of a company was measured by using two alternative proxies - the book value of assets 
(Haushalter, 2000; Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001) and 
the book value of total sales revenues (Allayannis and Weston, 2001). Leverage was also used as a proxy 
for the impact of fixed claims on the decision to hedge. Three different measures were constructed for the 
degree of a firm
’s financial leverage. First, financial leverage was defined as the ratio of the book value of 
long-term debt to the book value of assets (Tufano, 1996; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993; Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand, 1997), while the other measures were the ratio of the book value of long-term debt to 
the book value of equity (Hoyt and Khang, 2000; Allayannis and Weston, 2001; Mian, 1996) and the 
interest cover ratio defined as earnings before interest and taxes to the total interest expense (Geczy, 
Minton and Schrand, 1997; Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993). The coefficients on all variables presented 
were predicted to be positive. 
A binary variable was used to indicate whether a firm is rated by the rating agencies, what was a 
proxy for asymmetric information problem. The variable was coded as “1” for companies that have credit 
rating and “0” otherwise. Everything else being equal, firms with credit rating have undergone more 
capital market scrutiny and are thus assumed to face fewer informational asymmetries than ones with no 
rated debt (Barclay and Smith, 1995b). Therefore, firms with a credit rating are predicted to hedge less 
extensively, while firms with greater informational asymmetry will benefit greatly from risk management 
activity (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Haushalter, 2000). The coefficient on this variable was predicted to be 
negative. 
Investment (growth) opportunities were measured as the ratio of investment expenditures to the 
book value of assets (Haushalter, 2000; Froot, Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; 
Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985). Investment opportunities are also measured as 
the ratio of investment expenditures to the value of total sales (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein 1993; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Dolde, 1995). The 
coefficients on these variables were predicted to be positive. 
To examine the tax hypothesis, we have used several measures of the firm’s effective tax function - 
total value of the tax loss carry-forwards and tax-loss carry-backs (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993), 
total value of the tax loss carry-forwards plus tax-loss carry-backs to the total assets (Smith and Stulz, 
1985; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997; Tufano, 1996), investment tax credits used to offset income tax 
payable (Nance, Smith and Smithson, 1993) and finally a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm has 
tax loss carry-forwards, tax-loss carry-backs or investment tax credits, and 0 otherwise (Allayannis and 
Ofek, 2001). The coefficients on all variables were predicted to be positive. FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-13 
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The level of a manager’s firm-specific wealth is represented in two ways - by the book value of the 
firm's equity owned by officers and directors (Tufano, 1996; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 1997) and by the 
fraction of the firm’s outstanding shares held by officers and directors (Hoyt and Khang, 2000; 
Haushalter, 2000). The incentives for managers to hedge should be increasing in both these variables 
(Smith and Stulz, 1985), therefore the coefficients were predicted to be positive. The extent to which 
options are used in managers’ compensation is gauged using a binary variable that equals one if managers 
of a firm own stock options and zero otherwise. We have predicted this proxy to be negatively related with 
the extent of hedging. We have employed two additional measures that proxy for risk aversion of the 
manager - manager age and tenure or human capital vested in the firm (Tufano, 1996). We have predicted 
that younger managers and those whose managers have shorter tenures on the job would be more inclined 
to manage risk. 
 
 
3.4. Research Results  
 
In this section we present the results of univariate and multivariate analysis. According to a mean 
comparison test conducted for the sub-sample of hedgers/nonhedgers (see: tables 1 and 2), our univariate 
analysis has discovered that hedgers are not statistically different from nonhedgers with respect to the 
cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt, investment (growth) opportunities, tax preference items or 
managerial utility. Correlation analysis has also shown no relation between tested variables. In other words, 
on the basis of the univariate results, we should reject all research assumptions regarding the shareholder 
maximisation hypothesis and the managerial utility maximisation hypothesis.  
 
Table 1. Group statistics Croatian hedgers/non-hedgers 
  Hedgers/Nonhedgers  N  Mean  Std. Deviation  Std. Error Mean 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  116,660.15  169,885.68  47,117.81  Total assets 
  
Companies that manage financial risks 36  314,742.00  687,747.11  114,624.52 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  58,597.77  44,758.38  12,413.74  Total sales revenues 
  
Companies that manage financial risks 36  154,467.42  243,697.19  40,616.20 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  7.692E-02  .2774  7.692E-02  Debt rating 
  
Companies that manage financial risks  36  .2500  .4392  7.319E-02 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  .227984  .177947  4.93537E-02  Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
  
Companies that manage financial risks  35  .213244  .186513  3.15264E-02 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  1.855125  4.423624  1.226892  Long-term debt-to-equity ratio 
  
Companies that manage financial risks  35  1.494286  3.997587  .675716 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  14.194680  27.878622  7.732139  Interest cover ratio 
  
Companies that manage financial risks  31  8.193411  21.920321  3.937006 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 4.55073E-02  4.59472E-02  1.27435E-02  Investment expenditures-to-
assets ratio 
   Companies that manage financial risks  36  .104053  .116531  1.94218E-02 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13 5.22958E-02  5.73013E-02  1.58925E-02  Investment expenditures-to-
sales ratio 
   Companies that manage financial risks  36  .293079  .701630  .116938 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  86,849.3077  271,609.6296  75,330.9574  Total value of tax loss carry-
forward and carry backs 
   Companies that manage financial risks 36  24,927.7222  93,360.1516  15,560.0253 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  2.474096  8.627105  2.392728  Total value of tax loss carry-
forward and carry backs-to-
total assets 
  
Companies that manage financial risks 36  7.86145E-02  .300018  5.00030E-02 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  743.0769  2,679.2019  743.0769  Investment tax credits 
  
Companies that manage financial risks  35  133.1143  474.5025  80.2056 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  .5385  .5189  .1439  Tax incentives-dummy 
  
Companies that manage financial risks  36  .3056  .4672  7.786E-02 FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-13 
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Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  3,354.685  5,429.100  1,505.761  Value of equity owned by 
managers 
   Companies that manage financial risks 36  8,330.786  21,300.245  3,550.041 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  .34574  .44983  .12476  Share of the company owned 
by management 
   Companies that manage financial risks  36  .13734  .27567  4.5945E-02 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 12  8.33E-02  .29  8.33E-02  Managers ownership of stock 
options 
   Companies that manage financial risks  36  .11  .32  5.31E-02 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  3.31  .95  .26  Managers age 
Companies that manage financial risks  36  3.28  .91  .15 
Companies that do not manage financial risks 13  15.15  9.21  2.55  Managers tenure 
  
Companies that manage financial risks  36  11.33  10.69  1.78 
Source: Croatian survey data  
 
 
Table 2. Independent samples t-test Croatian hedgers/non-hedgers 










          












                    Lower  Upper 
Equal variances assumed  1.928  .171  -1.021  47  .313  -198,081.85  194,037.16  -588,434.26  192,270.57  Total assets 
  
Equal variances not assumed      -1.598  44.151  .117  -198,081.85  123,930.90  -447,824.09  51,660.40 
Equal variances assumed  2.835  .099  -1.401  47  .168  -95,869.65  68,439.64  -233,552.44  41,813.15  Total sales 
revenues 
Equal variances not assumed      -2.257  40.806  .029  -95,869.65  42,470.89  -181,653.75  -10,085.55 
Equal variances assumed  10.376  .002  -1.324  47  .192  -.1731  .1307  -.4361  8.994E-02  Debt rating 
Equal variances not assumed      -1.630  34.007  .112  -.1731  .1062  -.3889  4.271E-02 
Equal variances assumed  .014  .906  .246  46  .807  1.47397E-02  5.98659E-02  -.105764  .135244  Long-term debt-
to-assets ratio 
Equal variances not assumed      .252  22.471  .804  1.47397E-02  5.85637E-02  -.106567  .136046 
Equal variances assumed  .685  .412  .270  46  .788  .360839  1.335894  -2.328176  3.049853  Long-term debt-
to-equity ratio 
Equal variances not assumed      .258  19.743  .799  .360839  1.400663  -2.563334  3.285011 
Equal variances assumed  1.480  .231  .764  42  .449  6.001269  7.856053  -9.852887  21.855425  Interest cover 
ratio 
Equal variances not assumed      .692  18.531  .498  6.001269  8.676749  -12.190565  24.193103 
Equal variances assumed  3.763  .058  -1.753  47  .086  -5.854539E-02 3.33946E-02  -.125727  8.63598E-03  Investment 
expenditures-to-
assets ratio  Equal variances not assumed      -2.520  46.491  .015  -5.854539E-02 2.32293E-02  -.105290  -1.180053E-02
Equal variances assumed  2.783  .102  -1.228  47  .226  -.240784  .196139  -.635365  .153797  Investment 
expenditures-to-
sales ratio  Equal variances not assumed      -2.040  36.269  .049  -.240784  .118013  -.480064  -1.503154E-03
Equal variances assumed  4.667  .036  1.202  47  .235  61,921.5855  51494.2900  -41,671.5640 165,514.7349 Total value of 
tax loss carry-
forward and  Equal variances not assumed      .805  13.038  .435  61,921.5855  76,921.1774 -104,207.7188 228,050.8898
Equal variances assumed  12.825  .001  1.695  47  .097  2.395482  1.413014  -.447136  5.238100  Total value of 
tax loss carry-
forward and  Equal variances not assumed      1.001  12.010  .337  2.395482  2.393251  -2.818459  7.609423 
Equal variances assumed  8.352  .006  1.315  46  .195  609.9626  463.7890  -323.5962  1,543.5215  Investment tax 
credits 
Equal variances not assumed      .816  12.281  .430  609.9626  747.3930  -1,014.3489  2,234.2741 
Equal variances assumed  2.018  .162  1.497  47  .141  .2329  .1556  -8.0139E-02 .5460  Tax incentives-
dummy 
Equal variances not assumed      1.423  19.482  .170  .2329  .1636  -.1090  .5748 
Equal variances assumed  2.627  .112  -.827  47  .412  -4,976.101  6,013.516  -17,073.735  7,121.533  Value of equity 
owned by 
managers  Equal variances not assumed      -1.290  44.523  .204  -4,976.101  3,856.178  -12,745.138  2,792.936 FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-13 
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Equal variances assumed  10.182  .003  1.957  47  .056  .20839  .10646  -5.78067E-03 .42257  Share of the 
company owned 
by management  Equal variances not assumed      1.567  15.379  .137  .20839  .13295  -7.43788E-02 .49117 
Equal variances assumed  .297  .588  -.267  46  .790  -2.78E-02  .10  -.24  .18  Managers 
ownership of 
stock options  Equal variances not assumed      -.281  20.683  .781  -2.78E-02  9.88E-02  -.23  .18 
Equal variances assumed  .101  .752  .100  47  .921  2.99E-02  .30  -.57  .63  Managers age 
  
Equal variances not assumed      .099  20.619  .922  2.99E-02  .30  -.60  .66 
Equal variances assumed  .003  .955  1.143  47  .259  3.82  3.34  -2.91  10.55  Managers tenure 
  
Equal variances not assumed      1.227  24.528  .232  3.82  3.11  -2.60  10.24 
Source: Croatian survey data 
 
In the employed logistic regression we have tested the hypothesis that the decision to hedge or not is a 
function of the following factors - financial distress costs, size, agency cost of debt, costly external 
financing, tax incentives to hedge and managerial utility. The variables tested in our multivariate regression 
model are based on the determinants we have presented in the literature review as the key rationales of 
corporate hedging decisions. The relationship between the decision to hedge and its potential determinants 
can be expressed in the format of a general function as follows: 
 
Hedge = f (S, FC, AC, CEF, T, MU)  (1) 
 
where: 
•  Hedge - binary variable which takes on a value of “1” if the firm hedges and “0” if the firm does not 
hedge with these instruments 
•  S – size of the company  
•  FC - the firm's probability of financial distress or bankruptcy 
•  AC – the agency costs of debt facing the firm 
•  CEF - costly external financing and investment (growth) opportunities 
•  T - the convexity of the firm's tax function  
•  MU – managerial utility   
 
Table 3 reports multivariate analysis results relating the probability of hedging to the determinants of 
hedging. The predetermined independent variables include total sales revenues as a proxy for size, long-
term debt to assets ratio as a proxy for financial distress costs, debt rating as a proxy for agency cost of 
debt, investment expenditures to assets as a proxy for costly external financing, total value of tax loss carry-
forwards and carry-backs as a proxy for tax incentives and share of the company value owned by 
management as a proxy for managerial utility. The underlined variables represent those independent 
variables which appear to be the most consistent in reporting statistically significant t-values, and which 
appear to be most consistent and relevant in the stepwise construction of logistic model. Apart from the 
model discussed here, as we have created multiple proxies available to measure some firm characteristics, 
we have estimated separate logistic regressions using all possible combinations of variables representing 
each predicted construct.  
Inclusion of all relevant variables in the regression model is very important due to the fact that, if 
relevant variables are omitted, the common variance they share with included variables may be wrongly 
attributed to those variables, or the error term may be inflated. Additionally, we excluded from our analysis 
the variables that that have not contributed to the strengths of the logistic model in predicting the decision 
to hedge (measured by the –2 Log Likelihood statistics and Goodness of fit tests). Exclusion of all 
irrelevant variables is very important because their presence in the model can cause the common variance 
they share with included variables to be wrongly attributed to the irrelevant variables. The greater the 
correlation of the irrelevant variable(s) with other independents, the greater the standard errors of the 
regression coefficients for these independents (see: www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm).  
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The model can be expressed as:  
Hedge = f (Total sales revenues, Long-term debt to assets, Debt rating, Investment expenditures to assets, 
Total value of tax loss carry-forwards and carry backs, Share of the company value owned by management) 
 
Table 3. Multivariate results Croatian hedgers/nonhedgers 
      Total number of cases:      49 (Unweighted) 
      Number of selected cases:   49 
      Number of unselected cases: 0 
 
      Number of selected cases:                 49 
      Number rejected because of missing data:  1 
      Number of cases included in the analysis: 48 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding: 
 
Original       Internal 
Value          Value 
       0       0 
       1       1 
 
Dependent Variable..   HEDGERS    Hedgers/Nonhedgers 
 
Beginning Block Number  1.  Method: Enter 
 
Variable(s) Entered on Step Number 
1..       SIZE2     Total sales revenues 
          FINCOST4  Long-term debt-to-assets ratio 
          AGCOST1   Debt rating 
          CMI2      Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio 
          TAX1      Total value of tax loss carry-forward and carry backs 
          MNGUTIL2  Share of the company owned by management 
 
Estimation terminated at iteration number 7 because 
Log Likelihood decreased by less than ,01 percent. 
 
 -2 Log Likelihood       28,177 
 Goodness of Fit         29,926 
 Cox & Snell - R^2         ,441 
 Nagelkerke - R^2          ,640 
 
                     Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
 Model                   27,895     6        ,0001 
 Block                   27,895     6        ,0001 
 Step                    27,895     6        ,0001 
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---------- Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-Fit Test----------- 
 
    HEDGERS  = Companies that d HEDGERS  = Companies that m 
 
Group   Observed    Expected    Observed    Expected     Total 
 
    1      5,000       4,708        ,000        ,292     5,000 
    2      4,000       3,262       1,000       1,738     5,000 
    3      1,000       2,254       4,000       2,746     5,000 
    4      2,000       1,680       3,000       3,320     5,000 
    5       ,000        ,790       5,000       4,210     5,000 
    6      1,000        ,250       4,000       4,750     5,000 
    7       ,000        ,046       5,000       4,954     5,000 
    8       ,000        ,009       5,000       4,991     5,000 
    9       ,000        ,000       5,000       5,000     5,000 
   10       ,000        ,000       3,000       3,000     3,000 
 
 
                     Chi-Square    df Significance 
 
Goodness-of-fit test     5,5172     8        ,7011 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Classification Table for HEDGERS 
The Cut Value is ,50 
                                      Predicted 
                          Companies that dCompanies that m   Percent Correct 
                                   0      Ù        1 
Observed                  ÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
   Companies that d   0   Ù        9      Ù        4      Ù   69,23% 
                          ÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
   Companies that m   1   Ù        1      Ù       34      Ù   97,14% 
                          ÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚØØØØØØØØØØØØØØØÚ 
                                                     Overall  89,58% 
 
----------------- Variables in the Equation ------------------ 
 
Variable        B        S.E.     Wald    df      Sig       R 
 
SIZE2       1,56E-05 1,140E-05   1,8704     1    ,1714   ,0000 
FINCOST4      -,5861    2,8927    ,0411     1    ,8394   ,0000 
AGCOST1       8,2391    4,3615   3,5685     1    ,0589   ,1673 
CMI2         40,1737   19,9344   4,0614     1    ,0439   ,1917 
TAX1        -1,3E-06 6,376E-06    ,0418     1    ,8380   ,0000 
MNGUTIL2     -8,1630    4,0624   4,0376     1    ,0445  -,1906 
Constant     -1,5248    1,3305   1,3133     1    ,2518 
 
                        95% CI for Exp(B) 
Variable       Exp(B)     Lower     Upper 
 
SIZE2          1,0000    1,0000    1,0000 
FINCOST4        ,5565     ,0019  161,3385 
AGCOST1     3786,1021     ,7339  19530794 
CMI2        2,800E+17    3,0134 2,602E+34 
TAX1           1,0000    1,0000    1,0000 
MNGUTIL2        ,0003     ,0000     ,8181 
 
1 new variables have been created. 
  Name         Contents 
 
  ZRE_54       Standardized Residual 
 
No outliers found.  No casewise plot produced. 
Source: Croatian survey data 
From the regression model presented in table 3, it can be seen that the corporate decision to hedge is 
related to company’s investment expenditures-to-assets ratio and share of the company owned by FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-13 
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management. Other variables that tested the research hypothesis are not statistically significant in the 
model; therefore they do not influence the decision to hedge or not to hedge corporate risks in the analysed 
Croatian companies. Investment expenditures-to-assets ratio is a proxy for capital market imperfections and 
costly external financing. This variable tests the prediction that hedgers are more likely to have larger 
investment (growth) opportunities (e.g. see: Froot, Scharfstein and Stein (1993) for theoretical arguments, 
or Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and 
Allayannis and Ofek (2001) for empirical evidence). Bessembinder (1991) has also shown that hedging 
activities are predicted to be greater in firms where growth opportunities constitute a larger proportion of 
firm value, because reductions in agency costs are most valuable for these firms. Therefore, we argue that 
the firm’s decision to hedge is predicted to be positively correlated with measures for investment (growth) 
opportunities. The results of our logistic model support our prediction and show a statistically significant 
positive relation between the decision to hedge and investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. When we 
conducted a robustness test regarding this result by employing other variable that was used as a proxy for 
costly external financing hypothesis, it was not statistically significant in the model. These findings suggest 
that the association between hedging and the investment (growth) opportunities is not robust.  
The second variable that is statistically significant in our model is the fraction of the firm’s 
outstanding shares held by the company’s management. We have argued that, due to the fact that firm’s 
managers have limited ability to diversify their own personal wealth position associated with stock holdings 
and their earnings’ capitalisation, they have strong incentives to hedge. The managerial utility 
maximisation hypothesis predicts that managers with greater stock ownership would prefer more risk 
management, while those with greater option holdings would prefer less risk management. This rationale 
was firstly proposed by Stulz (1984) and has been further explored by Smith and Stulz (1985). The results 
of some empirical studies have confirmed this hypothesis (e.g., see Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998), 
while, in contrast, Geczy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Haushalter (2000) have not found evidence that 
corporate hedging is affected by managerial shareholdings. Our results show a negative relation between 
the decision to hedge and the share of the company owned by management, which leads to the conclusion 
that firms that have a greater fraction of outstanding shares held by the company’s management have 
less incentives to hedge. This is contrary to our prediction and to the findings of Tufano (1996), who 
has found that firms whose managers have more wealth invested in the firm’s stocks manage more 
corporate risk. Other variables that were employed as proxies for the managerial utility hypothesis (value of 
company share owned by management, managers’ ownership of stock options, manager’s age and tenure) 
were not statistically significant in the model. Therefore we should reject the hypothesis regarding 
managerial utility maximisation. 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients for independent variables in the regression 
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Source: Croatian survey data 
 
To test the non-existence of multicollinearity as one of the important assumptions of logistic regression, 
we have calculated Pearson correlation coefficients between the independent variables employed (see: table 
4). To the extent that one independent is a linear function of another independent, the problem of 
multicollinearity will occur in logistic regression. As the independents increase in correlation with each 
other, the standard errors of the logit (effect) coefficients will become inflated. Multicollinearity does not 
change the estimates of the coefficients, only their reliability (see: 
www2.chass.ncsu.edu/garson/pa765/logistic.htm). From the data presented in the table 4, it could be 
concluded that there is no correlation between variables, therefore the calculated logit coefficients in our 
model should be reliable.  
 
 
4.  Discussion and Conclusion 
 
On the basis of the research results it could be concluded that the explored hedging rationales have little 
predictive power in explaining corporate risk management decisions in Croatian companies. The evidence 
based on multivariate empirical relations between the decision to hedge in Croatian non-financial 
companies and financial distress costs, size, agency cost of debt, costly external financing, taxes and 
managerial utility fails to provide any support for any of the tested hypotheses but one - costly external 
financing measured by investment expenditures-to-assets ratio. Our multivariate analysis has shown that 
hedgers have a statistically higher value of this ratio, suggesting that there is a positive relation between 
the value of a company’s investment and the decision to hedge. This result is consistent with our 
prediction that the benefits of hedging should be greater the more growth options there are in the firm’s 
investment opportunity set and to the findings of Bessembinder (1991), Dobson and Soenen (1993), Nance, 
Smith and Smithson (1993), Getzy, Minton and Schrand (1997) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001). FEB – WORKING PAPER SERIES       07-13 
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Regarding this result, we need to emphasise that the association between hedging and costly external 
financing is not robust to the other variable employed as a proxy for testing this hypothesis. Also, the result 
has not been supported by univariate analysis; therefore it should be interpreted with care.  
Moreover, our analysis has revealed statistically significant relation between the decision to hedge and 
managerial utility maximisation hypothesis but this relation is contrary to the predicted sign. Multivariate 
analysis has revealed that the corporate decision to hedge is negatively related to the share of the company 
owned by management, suggesting that Croatian companies where managers have more wealth invested in 
company stocks are less likely to hedge. This result is inconsistent to the results of previous studies cited in 
our paper and to our own prediction. However, we need to emphasise that the inability to use variables 
employed in other studies (e.g. see: Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996; Geczy, Minton and Schrand, 
1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 2000) as proxies for the extent to which options are used in 
managers’ compensation plans
5, has prevented us from testing whether managerial option holdings in 
Croatian companies has an impact on the result that managers who own company’s shares do not act in a 
risk averse manner and have less incentive to hedge corporate risks. Managerial option holdings are not 
available as public information in the case of Croatian companies and managers were not willing to reveal 
this information in the survey questionnaire.  
We believe a negative relation between the decision to hedge and share of the company owned by 
management can be explained by the fact that, apart from stock holdings, Croatian managers also have 
option-like provisions. It has been proven (Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998) that managers with greater 
option holdings would prefer less risk management. The theoretical explanation for this is offered by Smith 
and Stulz (1985) who claimed that managers’ compensation plans can influence their hedging choices. 
They have argued that the expected utility of managerial wealth has the shape of a convex function of the 
firm’s expected profits when managers own unexercised options. Therefore, the more option-like features 
there are in the compensation plans, the less managers will hedge. In this case, managers can choose to 
increase the risk of the firm in order to increase the value of their options. Yet, further research among the 
analysed Croatian companies should be conducted to confirm this argument as it is based only on our 
opinion, not on empirical evidence.  
Directions for further research stem from our research findings as well as from missed opportunities 
that indicate avenues for future research. The advantage of our work is that it provides an impetus for 
further research to move beyond the existing hedging theories, which have proven inadequate in explaining 
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